The Defense Department is finally learning some key lessons on innovation, getting away from big expensive programs that produce overly sophisticated weapons and moving toward buying more weapons faster and more cheaply, representatives from Anduril, Saildrone, and Lockheed told lawmakers Wednesday.
The department is also discovering how new software strategies can increase the value of what it already has in its inventory. But the Pentagon still has work to do in setting universal standards and prioritizing low cost, modular-software-based approaches to weapons making, they said during a House Armed Services subcommittee hearing.
One example of how information technology is making old weapons new again is the Patriot missile system. In May, Ukraine shocked the world when it shot down a Russian Kinzhal hypersonic missile–a missile Putin had touted as “invincible”–using a U.S.-supplied Patriot battery first designed in the 1970s. It should serve as an important lesson for weapons makers and the Pentagon about how to get more out of weapons they already have through new software fixes, said James Taiclet, the CEO of Lockheed Martin.
Specifically, the shootdown shows how “you leverage existing systems, in this case, the Patriot missile system, to be able to deal with a more advanced threat using software and advanced networking technologies before you can build a new hardware system,” he said.
At a time when the United States is spending billions of dollars on new satellites to track highly maneuverable missiles, Ukraine’s Patriot shows that the United States already has a hypersonic defense in a crude form, Taiclet said. “There’ll be a cat-and-mouse game that will continue here, because the more sophisticated the maneuvering and the final terminal stage of the missile can go, the tougher it’s going to be to hit. We’re already playing cat-and-mouse with hypersonic defence. And I would say that is a significant deterrent.”
The executives were broadly enthusiastic about the Defense Department’s recently announced Replicator program to quickly produce thousands of low-cost drones for the air, land, and sea.
“Mass is going to be the determining quality that really matters. You know, the number of systems we can field and the rate we can replenish them. The volume we can get…pre-positioned and ready and demonstrate that we have that capacity is absolutely critical to creating deterrence” said Brian Schimpf, the CEO and co-founder of Anduril.
However, he said, while a big program to buy lots of drones is a good step, the Defense Department is still holding too many competitions for which companies present white papers for solutions instead of actual prototypes to test. And the Defense Department needs to write bigger checks early when it finds winners, he said.
What the department needs is “sustained and ruthless competition among serious bidders providing developed capabilities, not white paper submissions featuring familiar contestants and derivative wares. The competitions must be based on actual products, not just paper evaluations. And they should end in a meaningful award.”
As the digital complexity of weapons grows, the Pentagon should also move toward coherent and universal software standards so it’s not dealing with hundreds of different devices with wildly different software frameworks, Taiclet said.
“If there are 10,000 competitors…what are the interface technologies we’re going to use? What is the error-correction code to allow people to share? We’ll cross license those to each other so that our investments, whether a small, medium, or large company, are compensated for and there’s some return to our investors,” said Taiclet, who pointed out that when the telecommunications industry converged on a single standard in the early 2000s for mobile, it allowed the industry to graduate from 3G to 4G to 5G in the amount of time it usually takes the Pentagon to design and build a new plane.
The United States should also examine rules that govern where defense contractors are allowed to produce weapons, so they can shift some production closer to their adversaries. They cited the AUKUS Agreement as a possible model.
But some of the executives’ recommendations also clearly served the interests of their individual companies at least as well as those of the Defense Department. The idea that Defense Department standards should be streamlined favors the larger, more established companies to create them.
Similarly, Taiclet suggested the Defense Department move away from asking companies to produce very specific systems according to strict requirements and instead look to companies to solve more broadly defined problems, which Taiclet described as “missions.”
“We have created institutional capability to map missions. The mission could be “air superiority.”… DOD might say, “We’re paying you to do this X. Give us air superiority here.” as opposed to saying, “Produce this system ‘…”Our view is that the way to achieve this would be to create this roadmap of missions, which would mean: What are…the airplanes I have? How many radar systems do I own? What are the satellite sensors that could be looped into a mission to shoot down enemy airplanes before they can shoot you down?”
The idea, no matter its merits, favors large, established prime contractors that can much more easily integrate their own planes, drones, and sensors. The contractor will have an incentive to integrate their products, rather than those of the competitors. This could result in higher costs for U.S. taxpayers. taxpayers.
At one point during the hearing, California Democratic Rep. Ro Khanna brought up a June 60 Minutes report on defense contractor price gouging, and asked Taiclet if Lockheed Martin could accept a cap of 20% on the profits it made on any particular weapons system.
Taiclet refused the offer, saying that it would be better to have this conversation elsewhere.
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